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ABSTRACT: In recent years, a growing body of literature has started to take up the issue of collectivity 
within the capability approach, by particularly examining the notion of collective capabilities, the reasons 
for using this concept, its critiques and limitations. However, a proper categorization of collective capabili-
ties aiming at defining which types of capabilities actually are, is rarely studied. The goal of this contribu-
tion is to fill such gap by categorizing collective capabilities as well as providing a specific list of collective 
combined capabilities. The list includes two collective capabilities: the ‘resistant capability’ and the ‘resili-
ent capability’. After having briefly outlined the most recent contributions of the capability theorists for 
including the issue of the collectivity within the Capability Approach (CA), I then proceed as follows. First, I 
examine what collective capabilities are and why they matter for the CA. Second, I provide a categorization 
of collective capabilities based on the ontological difference between collective and individual capabilities. 
Third, the resulting extension of Nussbaum’s version of the CA is carried out by including a specific list for 
collective combined capabilities. Finally, I investigate how this extension affects Nussbaum’s CA. 
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1. Introduction  
 
One fundamental area of dispute among capability theorists is that the capability 
approach (CA) is too individualistic.  
Notwithstanding the version of the CA of Nussbaum and Sen differ in some regards 
(Clark, 2005:6-8; Robeyns, 2005:103-107), the critique of a narrow focus on the indi-
vidual can be applied to both scholars
1
. 
Although Sen (1999) acknowledges the instrumental value of collective organizations 
and social relationships in expanding or constraining individual freedoms (Sen 2002; 
Robeyns 2005; Godfrey-Wood & Mamani-Vargas 2017), he is rather careful in accept-
ing the concept of ‘collective capabilities’ as those capabilities resulting from collective 
action still remain “socially dependent individual capabilities”(Sen 2002: 85). 
Similarly, Nussbaum’s version of the CA remains within an individualistic framework 
because, as she clearly puts it: 
 
the person, not the group, is the primary subject of political justice, and policies that improve 
the lot of a group are to be rejected unless they deliver the central capabilities to each and 
every person. In these ways, my approach to the issue of care lies squarely within the liberal 
tradition (Nussbaum, 2006: 216). 
 
In response to this, several authors have therefore discussed the urgent need to intro-
duce collective capabilities. In answering the questions why and how the concept of 
collective capabilities2 can be integrated in the analysis of human capabilities (Ibrahim, 
2006), capability theorists have provided different pathways. In order to frame the top-
ic of collectivity through the lens of the CA, some authors have given more relevance to 
the internal individual perspective, while others on the external and descriptive per-
spective (Leßmann and Roche, 2013).  More specifically, a first strand of research fo-
cuses on how collectivities can enhance individuals’ well-being in terms of capabilities 
(Ibrahim, 2013), while a second strand gives more emphasis on agency, going beyond 
 
1
 See also the different position over this point and the lively debate summarized by Robeyns in (Robeyns 
2005). 
2
 The term ‘collective capabilities’ was first used by Peter Evans (Evans 2002). Since then, the literature has 
labelled these new capabilities by using the following, different terms: collective capabilities (Ibrahim 
2006; Evans 2002; Ballet et al. 2007), group capabilities (Stewart 2005), relational capabilities (Dubois, J.L., 
Lompo, K., Giraud, G. Renouard 2008), joint capabilities (Hall 2017), and external capabilities (Handy 
2008). 
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individuals’ well-being (Volkert 2013; Davis 2013; Ballet et al. 2007; Deneulin 2006)
3
. A 
further strand has then explored the idea of collective capabilities in the context of the 
struggles of indigenous peoples. In particular, Schlosberg and Carruthers (Schlosberg & 
Carruthers 2010) point out how the notion of collective capabilities is present in the 
practice of indigenous peoples’ movements for ecological justice, while Murphy 
(Murphy 2014) suggests considering the political self-determination (of indigenous 
groups) as a collective capability, by highlighting the instrumental value of collective 
political empowerment in the developmental process. 
Nevertheless, among numerous attempts provided by capability theorists, one of 
the most significant contributions with regard to the main goal of this paper, i.e. cate-
gorizing collective capabilities, is that of Stewart, who argued first that group capabili-
ties should be considered as a distinct category (Stewart 2005). First, because they en-
hance well-being, second because they provide a mechanism for the enlargement of 
individual capabilities, and finally because they influence preferences and values help-
ing to determine which capabilities individuals value (Stewart, 2005). Also, as pointed 
out by Stewart, since groups are usually instrumental to achieve some wider purpose, 
it is worth noting that not every group aspires to noble ends. It follows that at least two 
groups can be identified: the group formed by the better off, that might increase ine-
qualities and be evaluated negatively; and groups formed by poor people, that are 
more likely to pursue just income distribution and poverty eradication (Stewart 2005). 
In doing so, she sheds a light on how inequalities of group capabilities are important 
not only because they can reduce people's individual well-being, but also as the central 
source of conflicts (e.g. environmental conflicts). As clearly reported by Stewart 
 
horizontal inequalities are multidimensional, including political as well as economic and so-
cial dimensions. Deprivation (or fear of deprivation) of group access to political resources can 
be a powerful source of resentment and mobilisation. In economic dimensions, it is not only 
a matter of income, but also of assets and jobs. In social dimensions, it is a question of social 
 
3
 In this regard, it is worth noting Deneulin’s contribution as one of the first capability theorists who recog-
nizes how the exercise of individual agency is of little effect in removing un-freedoms. In a similar line of 
investigation, see also Ballet et al. who try to extend Sen’s CA by introducing the issues of personal re-
sponsibility and collective capability (Ballet et al. 2007). The primary aim of the authors is to replace the 
notion of the subject as a ‘faceless’ individual used by the analytical philosophy approach with the en-
riched notion of the subject used by the phenomenological approach. The reason for favouring this second 
understanding of the subject relies on the possibility of achieving a stronger version of agency. According 
to the authors, while the concept of agency rooted in the subject as ‘faceless’ individual is apparently 
weak; the introduction of the personal responsibility of the subject used by the phenomenological ap-
proach leads to a strong version of agency. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 11(3) 2018: 813-837, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v11i3p813 
  
816 
 
outcomes (such as health or nutrition outcomes) and also access to social services of differ-
ent kinds. What we are talking of here are basically group capabilities (and sources of capa-
bilities) of various kinds (Stewart, 2005:192).  
 
In exploring the question concerning how the concept of collective capabilities can 
be integrated in the analysis of human capabilities, however, Stewart does not seem to 
provide a proper strategy, rather a general definition of group capabilities as “the aver-
age of the capabilities (and sources of capabilities) of all the individuals in the selected 
groups” (Stewart, 2005:192).  Similarly, other capability theorists, such as Comim and 
Carey, seek to define such group/collective capabilities as “those capabilities that can 
only be achieved socially … as a result of social interaction” (Comim and Carey, 
2001:17).  
As a result, despite Stewart's efforts in showing the link between group achieve-
ments/inequalities (or horizontal inequalities) and group mobilisation, and other capa-
bility theorists’ efforts to define collective capabilities, it seems that all those attempts 
fail to provide a collective capabilities’ categorization. What all those proposals have in 
common is that, rather than conceiving collective capabilities as new capabilities, they 
are more like to frame them as the ‘environment’ within which individual capabilities 
can be located. In other words, what they call ‘collective capabilities’ is simply a collec-
tive framework for (enhancing) individual capabilities.  
Unlike this part of the literature, Ibrahim takes the question seriously, by arguing 
that collective capabilities 
 
are not simply the sum (or average) of individual capabilities, but rather new capabilities that 
the individual alone would neither have nor be able to achieve, if he/she did not join a collec-
tivity. Collective capabilities affect individual choices in two ways: first, they affect the indi-
vidual’s perception of the good (i.e. what constitutes a ‘valuable functioning’ for him/her) 
and, secondly, they determine his/her ability to achieve these functionings (Ibrahim, 
2006:404). 
 
As explained above, whether conceived as the average of individual capabilities, or 
capabilities that can only be achieved as a result of social interaction, collective capabil-
ities are likely to be more than the sum of individual capabilities, being new, distinct 
capabilities to be categorized.  
To this end, the article tries to contribute to the debate by identifying a specific list 
of collective combined capabilities. The main purpose of this article is indeed to extend 
Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach by identifying, categorizing and includ-
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ing a specific list for collective combined capabilities composed of resistant capability
4
 
and resilient capability. 
In doing so, the paper first examines what collective capabilities are and why are   
they important. Second, it provides a categorization of collective capabilities based on 
the ontological difference between collective and individual capabilities. Third, it pro-
vides a specific list for collective combined capabilities. Finally, the paper moves into 
question of how this extension affects Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities ap-
proach.  
 
 
2. What collective capabilities are and why they are important  
  
Collective capabilities can be defined as those capabilities exercised by a group – or 
more generally by a collective subject – that acts “in order to secure a capability for the 
members of that group”(Robeyns 2017:116).  
     In this regard, collective capabilities radically diverge from those capabilities that the 
literature has labelled as external capabilities, i.e. capabilities only accessible by direct 
connection or relationship with others (Handy 2008). Indeed, external capabilities ulti-
mately reside in the individual’s capability set as both the action and the achieved 
functioning are individual. An example of external capability is children’s wide range of 
activities that are achievable only by the care of a parent (Handy 2008). In this exam-
ple, the subject is not a group and the action is not collective accordingly.  
     By contrast, collective capabilities ontologically differ from other individual capabili-
ties as both the action taken and the achieved functioning are collective. This is the 
case of first women’s movement fighting for acquiring the capability to vote in elec-
tions. The subject is definitely a group, the action is necessarily collective, and the ca-
pabilities obtained are for all the members of the group (Robeyns 2017).  
     Given the definition of collective capabilities, why should we introduce this new cat-
egory within Nussbaum’s version of the CA? 
     The rationale behind the introduction of collective capabilities partly relies on the 
fact that Nussbaum’s version of the CA is designed to offer the philosophical grounding 
for constitutional principles, when the implementation of such principles depends on 
the internal politics of the nation. However, economic globalization in its most recent 
 
4
 I am very grateful to the anonymous referee who suggested me to change the term ‘negative capability’ I 
initially used for the term ‘resistant capability’ to avoid confusion with malevolent capability used in the 
literature.   
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form has been limiting the capacity of governments to ensure the threshold level of 
basic rights for all citizens.  
     Leaving aside the debate on the unsuccessful austerity measures used to boost 
competitiveness and economic efficiency, one of the causes of the current crisis of the 
welfare state can be also identified in the excessive emphasis on the individual capabil-
ities and individual agency, rather than considering the added-value of including collec-
tive capabilities and collective agency respectively.  
     Although the causality between good governance and the degree of citizen’s en-
gagement has been discussed at length in the literature (Putnam 1993; Bourdieu 1985; 
Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990)
5
, over the years the vice of modern democracy has 
been to promote individualism and an unwillingness to engage in public affairs 
(Fukuyama 2000 : 7). Thus, the impacts of globalisation and such excessive individual-
ism have led to the incapacity of modern liberal democracies to ensure the threshold 
level of each capability, i.e. that level of well-being “beneath which it is held that truly 
human functioning is not available to citizens” (Nussbaum, 2000:6).  
       In view of this, the sole individualistic focus of the CA appears substantially unsuit-
able to face the challenges arising from globalization. A greater consideration of a col-
lective dimension of capabilities to foster the removal of un-freedoms and the expan-
sion of citizens’ capabilities seems therefore necessary.  
       In this regard, collective capabilities are intended to provide a sort of horizontal in-
strument to groups, in addition to and separate from, the unsuccessful vertical instru-
ment resulting from the interaction between State and every single citizen. Such dis-
tinction between horizontal and vertical instruments has been initially analysed by the 
civil versus government social capital debate6.  
    Particular attention to this topic has been first devoted by Robert Putnam who 
points out that  
 
the fact that vertical networks are less helpful than horizontal networks in solving di-
lemmas of collective action may be one reason why capitalism turned out to be more 
 
5
 The importance of ‘social capability’ for economic growth has been also emphasized in the findings of 
Temple and Johnson (Temple & Johnson 1998). In this regard, see also World Bank Social Capital Initiative 
studies that show the effects of social relations and informal institutions in individual livelihoods and wider 
development outcomes. The results demonstrate that networks and the norms of reciprocity are crucial in 
activating collective endeavours that may help development initiatives (Grootaert, Christiaan Bastelaer 
2001). 
6
 For a critical examination of the literature con social capital and governmental institution, see among 
others (Breuskin 2012; Fukuyama 2000; Ramos-pinto 2004). 
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efficient than feudalism in the eighteenth century, and why democracy has proven 
more effective than autocracy in the twentieth century” (Putnam 1993:175). 
 
Making no pretence to offer a comprehensive discussion of “the culture-vs.- structure, 
chicken-and-eggs debate” (Putnam 1993 : 181), i.e. whether social capital is the driving 
motor of political performances or rather the outcome of political institutional ar-
rangements, this article argues the interaction between civil society and governmental 
institutions by the notion of collective capabilities. 
      In other words, the incapacity of modern liberal democracies to achieve the social 
goal of getting citizens above the capability threshold might be compensated by recog-
nizing this horizontal instrument, i.e. collective capabilities, to the groups acting to 
make certain rights working for improving living conditions of both the group, and its 
members. Thus, given the centrality of substantial freedoms within the CA (Sen, 
1999:18) in its twofold understanding of removing un-freedoms and expanding citi-
zens’ capabilities, the collective capabilities examined below (resistant capability and 
resilient capability) are designed to cover both aspects. 
 
The added-value of resistant capability  
 
By the term resistant capability, I refer to the negative moment of every social mobili-
zation concerned with the right of resistance. The resistant capability is conceived as 
opposition and resistance against top-down decisions generating structural injustices 
imposed by authorities upon any group. In doing so, the resistant capability is intended 
as instrumental for removing substantial un-freedoms, by preventing affected groups 
from getting below the capability threshold (Nussbaum, 2000).  
      This idea of resisting against fixed schemes of division and hierarchy can be well 
traced back to the traditional social contract theory of John Locke and to his right to 
resistance and/or self-defence of the people. In Two Treatises of Government (1690), 
Locke affirms that “the people […] have the right to resume their original liberty” 
(Locke, 1690: 360), that means an explicit right to overthrow a government when it 
acts against people's interests – e.g. by reducing citizens to slavery – (Locke, 1690: 359-
360). In most recent times, Roberto Unger applies this idea of resistance to the follow-
ing concept of negative capability7 as instrumental to empower democracy. 
 
7
 In a completely different conception, the term ‘negative capability’ was first used by John Keats, the Ro-
mantic English poet, in order to criticize those who attempted to classify all experience and phenomena 
and transform them into a theory of knowledge. Keats defined the concept as follows: “I mean Negative 
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… all the varieties of individual and collective empowerment seem to be connected in 
one way or another with the mastery the concept of disentrenchment or denaturaliza-
tion describes. I call these varieties of empowerment “negative capability” when con-
sidering them in relation to the context change that makes them possible. Thus, we 
may use the poet's turn of phrase to label the empowerment that arises from the deni-
al of whatever in our contexts delivers us over to a fixed scheme of division and hierar-
chy and to an enforced choice between routine and rebellion (Unger, 1997:174). 
 
Rather than providing the theoretical framework for establishing/justifying anarchy, 
Unger’s definition of negative capability is more likely to aim at safeguard-
ing/empowering democracy. 
     In other words, he seems to suggest the grounding of a sort of doctrine of empow-
ered democracy, where empowerment largely depends on the invention of more dis-
entrenched, revisable institutions. 
     In turn, the improvement of institutions is pursued by an alternative practical em-
powerment to promote economic and technological progress as well as democratic 
ideals. To this end, strengthening negative capability looks therefore very promising8. 
     Despite the similarities reported above, my conception of resistant capability radi-
cally diverges from both Locke and Unger in at least one respect: the subject entitled to 
exercise the resistant capability. 
     Both Unger and Locke, indeed, generally belong to the liberal individualistic tradition 
that largely rests on the priority of individuals as well as basic individual rights. As a re-
sult, Locke still identifies the rather indistinct category of people as the subject of the 
revolution, while Unger mainly focuses on the negative capability of individuals and 
therefore on the individual rather than on the collective empowerment. 
    Unlike such priority on individuals, whether the mere sum or aggregation of individ-
uals, I hold that such capacity to resistance is a specific prerogative of a supra-
individual subject that I call collective subject9. Conceived as something more than a 
mere sum of individuals, it includes any group acting to make a right working in the 
concrete life of both the group as a collective subject, and its members, improving their 
living conditions. 
 
Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,' without any irrita-
ble reaching after fact and reason” (Keats, 1899: 177). 
8
 The need to include the collective dimension within CA to empower citizens and particularly the most 
disadvantaged, can be also found in (Ibrahim, 2013:7) and (Volkert, 2013:11-12). 
9
 Its main features and characteristics will be widely discussed in the next paragraph. 
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   To sum up, neither isolated individuals, nor people, but any group that acts as a col-
lective subject for improving the living conditions of both the group, and its members, 
is therefore the subject of the resistant capability.  
  In this regard, trade unions can be considered an example of a collective subject. As 
pointed out by Marx, they have the agency to negotiate with the counterpart in order 
to make rights effective. 
 
The value of labour-power constitutes the conscious and explicit foundation of the 
trade unions, whose importance for the […] working class can scarcely be overestimat-
ed. The trade unions aim at nothing less than to prevent the reduction of wages below 
the level that is traditionally maintained in the various branches of industry. That is to 
say, they wish to prevent the price of labour-power from falling below its value (Marx, 
1867: 1069). 
 
Admittedly, trade unions were established exactly to represent the collective interests 
of workers in negotiations with employers. The primary aim was indeed to oppose the 
more powerful employer (whether a single individual or a collective body like a com-
pany) by the means of a subject with equal power: the trade union. The core idea was 
that the single, isolated worker could not be able to resist company's power, being def-
initely unequal in power. Conversely, a group of workers characterized by a sense of 
collective injustice had the capacity to resist against company's pressure, or, at least, 
more possibilities to succeed in that. Described by Dorceta Taylor as follows,  
 
the sense of collective injustice was both a hot cognition and a cognitive liberator for 
many. The sense of collective harms deepened people's outrage at the same time that 
it deepened their conviction to change conditions. The experiences encouraged people 
to adopt collective action strategies rather than trying to solve issues as isolated indi-
viduals or community groups (Taylor, 2000:561).  
 
Thus, trade unions arose from the spontaneous coalition of the same stakeholders 
(workers' associations) based on the awareness that the socioeconomic weakness 
characterizing the position of each of them towards their employers could be over-
come only through a collective action10.  
 
10
 Along the same line of reasoning, see also (Volkert, 2013:11): “collectivities have the ability to overcome 
people’s lack of effective power which establishes effective power as a constitutive element of direct 
agency. They also counteract disempowering processes that may prevent people from acting or from 
bringing about change”.  
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   Given that the removal of substantial un-freedoms is constitutive of development 
(Sen 1999), it follows that the added-value of resistant capability is to provide a pre-
cious instrument of empowerment of a collectivity by the means of collective action.  
    As Evans puts it “for the less privileged attaining development as freedom requires 
collective action. Organized collectivities – unions, political parties, village councils, 
women’s group, etc. —are fundamental to ‘people’s capabilities to choose the lives 
they have reason to value’” (Evans, 2002:56). In doing this, discriminated groups, such 
as low-income people, ethnic minorities, and so forth can (only) collectively achieve the 
social goal of getting above the capability threshold. 
     By acting together and therefore exercising such new type of collective capability, 
any group affected by structural injustices might be able to re-establish equal power 
relation and to remove forms of un-freedoms. 
In other words, the resistant capability (like collective capabilities as such) belongs to 
any group, but its exercise is subjected to certain external conditions. Examples of ex-
ternal conditions are: structural injustices, forms of discrimination/lack of recognition, 
hazard events, top-down decisions imposed upon groups, earthquakes, climate change 
impacts, environmental injustices.  
    Recognizing the exercise of the resistant capability to groups affected by such exam-
ples of external conditions means giving them a precious instrument for removing 
forms of un-freedoms, pursuing a just income distribution and poverty eradication 
(Stewart 2005). As noted above concerning Unger's understanding of the issue, this 
idea has nothing to do with anarchy. Conversely, the idea of collective capabilities as 
instrumental for grounding a doctrine of empowered democracy can be also applied to 
my proposal. 
 
The added-value of resilient capability  
 
As discussed above about the need to provide a collective dimension of capabilities, 
the sole individual agency does not succeed in removing un-freedoms (e.g. eradication 
of poverty), and in increasing capabilities to promote human freedoms.  
    Whereas the resistant capability is more likely to cover the first aspect (i.e. the re-
moval of un-freedoms) by increasing group’s collective capacity to resist to structural 
injustices, the resilient capability concerns with the second goal of increasing the col-
lective capability to promote human freedoms.  
     By this second term, i.e. resilient capability, I refer to the capacity of any group to 
react constructively to structural injustices by the means of: self-help initiatives, adap-
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tive strategies and collective agency
11
. In other words, the resilient capability repre-
sents the positive moment in which constructive responses of any group affected by 
unfavourable external conditions12 preventing the exercise of their major functions do 
contribute to the expansion of their freedoms. As noted above, such expansion posi-
tively affects the promotion of human freedoms and well-being of citizens accordingly. 
The more human freedoms are pursued, the more the expected level of well-being 
(capability threshold) can be achieved.  
   In addition, the resilient capability discussed in this article is based on the concept of 
resilience
13
 examined in its complementarity with the concept of resistance. Thus, just 
like the notion of resistance has been used to explain the resistant capability, resilience 
is mobilized to examine the resilient capability. As largely discussed by the literature, 
resilience and resistance are conceived as interlinked and complementary concepts 
(Bodin and Wiman, 2004). Whereas resistance measures to what extent a system can 
persist despite high levels of external pressure14, resilience is generally described as 
the “capacity for successful adaptation in the face of disturbance, stress, or adversity” 
(Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum, 2008 :129). 
    Examples of the application of resilience within the realm of capability approach can 
be notably found in Benoit Lallau's work. By using the framework of CA, Lallau explores 
the complex relationship between vulnerability and resilience in order to study poor 
peasant risk management strategies (Lallau 2008). The poverty traps dynamics are in-
vestigated in their close link to vulnerability, while resilience as a precious instrument 
to reduce both. In particular, Lallau refers to resilience as a “capacité de synthèse” 
(Lallau 2008 : 182). Based on the active and reactive behaviour of the individual in the 
face of environment, resilience is examined through the lens of risk management strat-
egies adopted. In turn, those latter are analysed in their twofold défensif (tending to 
maintain the existing) and offensif nature (trying to modify, or even break with the ex-
isting) (Lallau 2008 : 182). Such defensive and offensive nature of risk management 
 
11
 For a critical examination of social capital as an asset or a resource for resilience see (Ledogar & Fleming 
2008); for  a deeper discussion on self-help analysis and the CA see (Ibrahim 2006). 
12
 As explained above concerning the resistant capability, examples of unfavourable external conditions 
are: structural injustices, forms of discrimination/lack of recognition, hazard events, top-down decisions 
imposed upon groups, earthquakes, climate change impacts, environmental injustices. 
13
 The concept of resilience is a controversial one. It has been used in a large range of disciplines (physics, 
mathematics, ecology, engineering, psychology, sociology, geography, anthropology, public health, tech-
nology and communications), defined by them in different ways, and with different levels of meaning. For 
a useful list of definitions see (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum, 2008). 
14
 Resistance is also defined as “the amount of external pressure needed to bring about a given amount of 
disturbance in the system” (Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, and Abel, 2001:766). 
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strategies can be easily associated with, and introduced in the CA by the concepts of 
resistant and resilient capability.  
   However, unlike Lallau and the existent literature on this topic, the peculiarity of both 
resistant and resilient capability relies on the subject entitled to exercise these collec-
tive capabilities: the collective subject. As previously argued for the resistant capacity, 
the collective subject is more than a mere sum of individuals, and includes any group 
acting to make a right working for improving the living conditions of both the group 
and its members. 
   Similarly, the resilient capability is therefore exercised by the collective subject, ra-
ther than isolated individuals. A mere collection of resilient individuals, indeed, does 
not guarantee a resilient group (Pfefferbaumet al. 2005; Rose, 2004). 
   This consideration confirms both the initial argumentation concerning the need of 
considering collective capabilities as new capabilities distinct from individual capabili-
ties, and the opening premise that the capacity to cope with structural injustice can be 
(successfully) achieved only through collective actions. 
   Evidence of the importance of collective agency can be also found in the literature 
combining community social capital research and the concept of resilience (Ledogar & 
Fleming 2008). According to this strand of research, community social capital (Putnam 
1993), sometimes called “ecological social capital” (McKenzie et al. 2002; Whitley and 
McKenzie 2005), is generally described as made up of five components (Whitley & 
McKenzie 2005; De Silva et al. 2005; Putnam 1993): 
- community networks: voluntary, state, and personal networks; 
- civic engagement: participation and civic networks; 
- local civic identity: sense of belonging, of solidarity and of equality with other 
members of the community; 
- reciprocity and norms of cooperation; 
- trust in the community. 
All these components constitute illustrative examples/aspects of community social cap-
ital (or simply collective agency) activated in circumstances that may present a dan-
ger/injustice to groups. In such circumstances, indeed, collective agency is crucial to 
allow any group affected by hazard events to react constructively to structural injustic-
es and to contribute to the expansion of their freedoms. 
   To conclude, when growing inequalities reduce the size and the scope of the welfare 
state so as to increase the number of groups affected by a decrease in the well-being, 
and in the basic level of rights, recognizing a horizontal instrument such as the resilient 
capability can contribute significantly to the democratic empowerment of the collectiv-
ity. 
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   In this regard, any collective subject will better cope with collective injustices by a col-
lective instrument such as the collective capabilities. Thus, the expansion of citizens' 
capabilities (i.e. their access and opportunity to do things that they have reason to val-
ue) can be better pursued by enhancing collective agency.  
 
 
3. Categorizing Collective Capabilities 
  
The first challenge of this article is to categorize collective capabilities within Nuss-
baum’s version of the capabilities approach. 
As Nussbaum puts it (Nussbaum, 2000), capabilities can be distinguished as follows. 
(1) Basic capabilities constitute “the innate equipment of individuals that is the 
necessary basis for developing the more advanced capabilities, and a ground of 
moral concern” (Nussbaum, 2000: 84). 
(2) Internal capabilities are “developed states of the person herself that are, so far 
as the person herself is concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of the 
requisite functions” (Nussbaum, 2000: 84). Although, as Nussbaum points out, 
the support from the surrounding environment is often required to develop 
such internal capabilities.  
(3) Combined capabilities are defined as “internal capabilities combined with suit-
able external conditions for the exercise of the function” (Nussbaum, 2000: 84-
85). 
Given Nussbaum's distinction related to the three types of capabilities (basic, inter-
nal, combined), the first question is: which type of capabilities are the collective capa-
bilities? Are they an additional type of capabilities or can be included in one of the pro-
vided distinctions? 
 In addressing the question, I proceed by analysing the main difference between in-
dividual and collective capabilities. Yet, this latter relies on the ontological distinction 
given by the different subjects exercising those capabilities. Whereas individual capa-
bilities are exercised by individuals, collective capabilities are exercised by a collective 
subject. In other words, the need to provide a collective dimension of capabilities is ul-
timately addressed by introducing the following notion of collective subject15.  
 
15
 See (Ballet et al. 2007) who tries to extend Sen’s CA by replacing the analytical philosophy’s notion of a 
‘faceless’ individual with the concept of person. Provided by the phenomenological approach, the concept 
of person is considered by Ballet as the subject that best corresponds to his vision, including major aware-
ness of personal responsibility; see also (Hall 2017) who builds the notion of joint capabilities upon Marga-
ret Gilbert’s concept of plural subject agents.  
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The collective subject is a supra-individual subject. It is not simply the sum of indi-
viduals. It represents a new category that can no longer be included in the broader so-
cio-political categories of ‘society’, ‘people’, or (exclusively) ‘political party’. As it differs 
from the mere sum or aggregation of individuals, as the sum A+B+C+D would suggest, 
it is conceived as follows: (A+B+C+D) = (A+B+C+D+ɛ). Although the main reference con-
cerning the meaning of collective subject comes from Gramsci's concept of ‘organic in-
tellectual’ (Gramsci 2007), the concept of collective subject examined in this article dif-
fers from it at least for the following aspect. While Gramsci identifies the ‘organic intel-
lectual’ with the communist party, or ‘Modern Prince’ (Gramsci 2007), I argue that the 
collective subject may include any form of organized collectivities. 
In dwelling upon what actually the collective subject is about, I then proceed by ana-
lysing differences and similarities of this concept with Gramsci’s ‘Modern Prince’.  
In order to deceive the prison censors, Gramsci calls the communist party ‘Modern 
Prince’ and describes it as follows: 
 
the modern Prince, the myth-Prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can on-
ly be an organism, a social component in which a collective will – one that is recognized and, 
to some extent, has asserted itself in action – has already begun to take shape. Historical de-
velopment has already produced this organism, and it is the political party – the modern 
formation that contains the partial collective wills with a propensity to become universal and 
total (Gramsci, 2007: 247).  
 
The concept of collective will outlined by Gramsci, recognized and partly asserted it-
self in action, requires the existence of a particular kind of awareness. This cannot be 
an individual awareness, i.e. of a concrete individual, but of a collective organism. In 
turn, such collective organism, that Gramsci identifies with the political party, will give 
practical effect to already existing ideas and aspirations.  
To sum up, in Gramsci’s view the collectivity might be seen as the result of a collec-
tive will and collective thinking achieved through concrete individual effort, rather than 
of an inevitable process occurred outside the individuals. In such context, the political 
party has the main goal to identify those partial collective wills, in order to make them 
universal and total, i.e. applicable to the whole of society and to each member.  
Although many aspects listed by Gramsci are included in my analysis, the collective 
subject I propose differs from its description in two respects. 
1) Unlike the organic intellectual, the collective subject examined here may in-
clude any form of organized collectivities acting for making a right working in 
the concrete life of both the group, and its members. 
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2) The main goal of the collective subject is not to awake any national-popular 
collective will, but to allow groups to organize themselves collectively for re-
moving forms of un-freedoms and expanding their capabilities, when affected 
by unfavourable external conditions.  
The first difference is that the collective subject I propose is not identified solely with 
the political party. Rather, it may include any form of organized collectivities, such as: 
unions, political parties, village councils, women’s group, Citizen Assembly, etc. In oth-
er words, all those forms of association able to ensure people’s capabilities to choose 
the lives they have reason to value (Sen 1999) when the State fails to accomplish this 
task. 
The second difference is that, unlike Gramsci, the collective subject introduced here 
is not intended to awake any national-popular collective will, having a much more lim-
ited scope instead: allowing groups to organize themselves collectively for removing 
forms of un-freedoms and expanding their capabilities.  
The ‘collective will’ expressed by the collective subject radically diverges from Rous-
seau’s ‘general will’ and partly differs from Gramsci’s use of the term in the following 
respects. Unlike Rousseau, individuals who constitute the collective subject are not the 
body of the people. Rather than associations of citizens collectively called ‘the people’, 
the collective subject includes any group subjected to capability deprivation.  
As for Gramsci’s use of the term, while the modern Prince (i.e. the political party) is 
designed for promoting the forging of a collective will able to unite the people and na-
tion, the collective will examined in the present paper is closely related to the purpose 
for which the collective subject has been constituted: for getting citizens above the ca-
pability threshold. In other words, the forging of the collective will at stake in this arti-
cle is strictly linked to the achievement of the goals mentioned for describing the add-
ed-value of resistant and resilient capabilities: pursuing a just income distribution and 
poverty eradication or promoting human freedoms and well-being, respectively. Those 
goals are pursued by the means of collective action. As noted in the previous para-
graph concerning the resilient capability, a detailed list of collective actions will be not 
provided, as this list would be too generic, or simply too abstract. By contrast, a group-
based definition of concrete actions realizing collective capabilities would be highly de-
sirable. At any rate, self-help initiatives and adaptive strategies can be well mentioned 
as key examples of the collective action taken by the collective subject. The only fea-
ture that seems essential for any kind of collective action is that it is always dictated by 
the collective will and therefore aims at getting citizens above the capability threshold. 
To conclude, the common denominator of all the above mentioned concepts is the 
main purpose for which collective capabilities have been categorized. Admittedly, the 
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collective will as well as the collective action put into operation by the collective sub-
ject is outcomes-oriented: tackling the capability deprivation. Ultimately, the main 
purpose is to provide a horizontal instrument to groups affected by a decrease in the 
well-being, and in the basic level of rights in order to collectively achieve what might 
not be achieved individually. 
In a nutshell, the collective subject is the expression of a collective will, and it is able 
to take collective action aimed at getting above the capability threshold those individu-
als who fall below it. 
Having accomplished such brief overview of the ontological distinction between in-
dividual and collective capabilities, three hypotheses in order to outline which type of 
capability the collective capabilities are, are listed as follows.  
The first hypothesis might be to consider collective capabilities as a subcategory of 
combined capabilities. In doing so, collective capabilities might be defined as the spe-
cific substantial freedoms of collectivity. However, a closer inspection of the issue sug-
gests to reject this hypothesis on the ground that the combined capabilities are the re-
sult of the combination between internal capabilities and external conditions. This im-
plies therefore the combination of individual capabilities which, however, ontologically 
differ from collective capabilities.  
This limitation leads us to go beyond Nussbaum’s categorization by taking into ac-
count the external rather than internal capabilities. This second hypothesis, in fact, 
might be to add a new category conceived as the combination of external capabilities 
and external conditions. 
External capabilities are defined as “those abilities to function that are conferred by 
direct connection or relationship with another person” (Handy, 2008:1). In other 
words, external capabilities largely depend on an individual’s access to the capabilities 
of another person (Handy, 2008:8).  Accordingly, the added-value of external capabili-
ties consists of taking the social context into greater account. However, despite such 
second hypothesis may well turn out to be telling, it is only partially feasible for the fol-
lowing objection. External capabilities do not likewise ontologically differ from other 
individual capabilities as they ultimately reside in the individual’s capability set. 
As a result, even the external capabilities do not push beyond the individualistic 
framework of the CA, since the individual is still considered the reference point. 
As pointed out by Jackson et. al, 
 
the notion of external capabilities recognises social context while retaining the individual as 
reference point – it lingers on the margins of the capability approach, which is more com-
fortable with internal capabilities, and gives only a partial view of the economy; a complete 
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view would examine structural and social factors directly, not through the eyes of the indi-
vidual (Jackson, Otto, & Ziegler, 2014: 15).  
 
It follows that external capabilities cannot be used to constitute a specific category 
for collective capabilities. 
The inescapable, ontological distinction between individual and collective capabili-
ties leads us to opt in favour of the third hypothesis: the introduction of a separate 
category entitled collective combined capabilities, conceived as the combination of col-
lective capabilities and external conditions (e.g. structural injustices, forms of discrimi-
nation/lack of recognition, hazard events, top-down decisions imposed upon groups, 
earthquakes, climate change impacts, environmental injustices). This argumentation is 
based on the assumption that collective capabilities are ontologically distinct from in-
dividual capabilities. 
Indeed, collective capabilities can be defined as those capabilities that the individual 
alone would not be able to achieve, without joining a collectivity (adapted from 
Ibrahim, 2006: 398). Accordingly, this suggests to take into due account the topic of the 
autonomy of the collective subject, by looking at those capacities (only) ascribable to 
the collectivity itself. In a similar line of criticism (but with different outcomes) of Ballet 
(Ballet et al. 2007), I propose to replace the notion of the subject as a ‘faceless’ individ-
ual used by the analytical philosophy approach with the enriched notion of the collec-
tive subject described above. 
In addition to and separate from the combined capabilities (internal capabilities 
combined with external conditions), a specific, additional category entitled collective 
combined capabilities – resulting from the combination of collective capabilities and 
external conditions – is to be included. 
To sum up, the extension proposed in this paper allows us to list five rather than 
three types of capabilities – i.e. basic, internal, combined, collective, and collective 
combined capabilities – by adding collective and collective combined capabilities as 
new types of capabilities.  
A further question addressed in the following paragraph is therefore how this new 
categorization will affect the list of combined capabilities provided by Nussbaum. 
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4. Listing Collective Combined Capabilities 
  
The second challenge has to do with Nussbaum’s list of combined capabilities. In this 
regard, a key question is: are collective combined capabilities part of this list, or a spe-
cific list for collective combined capabilities is to be provided? 
According to the latest version of Nussbaum’s list, the combined capabilities are: (1) 
Life; (2) Bodily health; (3) Bodily integrity; (4) Senses, imagination and thought; (5) 
Emotions; (6) Practical reason; (7) Affiliation; (8) Other species; (9) Play; and (10) Politi-
cal and material control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2000:78-80; 2003:41-42; 
2006:76-78; 2011:33-34). 
As examined in the above paragraph, the ontological difference between combined 
capabilities, that undoubtedly fall within the individual framework, and collective com-
bined capabilities prevents from simply adding those latter in the same list. It follows 
that a separate, additional, specific list for collective combined capabilities is to be pro-
vided. The resulting separated list of collective combined capabilities – i.e. collective 
capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function 
– can be therefore outlined as follows: 
1. Resistant Capability: collective ability to resist to structural injustices, such as top-
down decisions imposed by authorities upon groups. 
2. Resilient Capability: collective ability to react constructively to structural injustic-
es, including collective actions taken by groups aimed at expanding their freedoms. 
The provided list is deliberately left vague in its content in order to promote, as 
much as possible, a community-based definition of concrete actions realizing collective 
capabilities.  
In doing so, each group using this horizontal instrument is more likely to determine 
which sort of self-help initiatives, adaptive strategies and, more generally, collective 
agency are necessary for functioning in their own communities. 
 
 
5. How this extension will affect Nussbaum’s version of the CA 
  
The third challenge of the paper moves into question of how and to what extent this 
extension (an additional list of collective combined capabilities) affects Nussbaum's 
version of the capabilities approach.   
In order to answer the question, two lines of arguments are examined as follows:  
1) the coherence of the extension with the CA’s individual framework and the im-
portance of ensuring affiliation;  
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2) the relationship between the concept of threshold level and collective capabilities. 
(1) A first general question is whether this attempt of extension within the CA's indi-
vidualistic framework is more likely to push beyond Nussbaum’s theory, rather than 
simply adjusts/extends it. 
In this regard, a first reason for caution might be that acknowledging the ontological 
difference between individual and collective capabilities could push beyond the indi-
vidualistic boundaries of the CA. In answering this objection, it is worth noting that the 
essential precondition for exercising the collective capabilities ultimately relies on the 
individual capacity of affiliation. The seventh capability listed by Nussbaum, indeed, re-
fers to the ability of the individual to “engage in various forms of social interaction” 
(Nussbaum, 2000: 79). Therefore, constituting forms of affiliation and ensuring the re-
lated freedom of assembly and political speech are definitely required in order to de-
velop any collective capability. 
The extension at stake differs from the communitarianism and more generally from 
those who want to establish a hierarchy between individuals and collectivity. Whether 
the priority falls on individuals or on collectivity, the idea of collectivity proposed by 
this extension is mainly grounded on the relationship between them. Such relationship 
radically diverges from the traditional contractualism like the one of Hobbes, who con-
ceives the collectivity in terms of subtraction. Indeed, while according to Hobbes all in-
dividuals join the society by ceding rights to a sovereign authority for the sake of pro-
tection, I conceive the relationship between collectivity and individuals in terms of ad-
dition. An individual who decides to join the collectivity to form a collective subject ex-
pands his capabilities. The democratic empowerment is therefore achieved by ensuring 
individuals have the capacity to join a group (affiliation) for the specific goal of getting 
above the capability threshold. In doing this, individuals expand their capabilities and 
achieve together what none can achieve alone. In this view, individuals do not forgo to 
achieve their ends in the wider interests of society16. Rather, individuals expand their 
capabilities precisely because of the restricted scope expressed by the given goal of the 
collective subject of which they form part.  
With regard to the process of pursuing the common goal, unlike communitarians for 
whom in a community the process itself is seen by members of the group as valuable in 
itself, my conception is rather more in line with that of the association. In this second 
case, such process is viewed only as instrumental for attaining the restricted goal for 
which the individuals have been engaged. It has no value in itself. 
 
16
 Not surprisingly, this idea also differs from more recent experiences of totalitarian regimes where hu-
man rights were systematically constrained/violated in the name of the Community's main interest. 
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In view of these considerations, this first criticism is easily rebutted on the ground 
that:  
- at the core of the collective capabilities there is the individual capability of affil-
iation; 
- the idea of collectivity, as it emerges from this extension, does not imply any 
hierarchy between individuals and collectivity, but a relationship conceived in 
terms of addition, rather than subtraction. 
As a result, this extension does not push beyond the CA's individualistic framework 
since the individual is still considered the reference point. 
2) The second line of reasoning investigates the relationship between the threshold 
level and collective capabilities. 
As discussed above, due to the limited capacity of governments to ensure the 
threshold level of basic rights for all citizens, a horizontal instrument to groups who 
(may) fall below the threshold level is to be provided. The primary aim of introducing 
the collective capabilities has been indeed to allow any group affected by a capability 
deprivation to organize themselves collectively for getting above the capability thresh-
old. 
In this view, my extension will affect Nussbaum's version of the capabilities ap-
proach since the social goal, i.e. getting above the capability threshold, can be also col-
lectively achieved by any groups affected by a capability deprivation. 
Instead of falling only within the State's obligations or prerogatives, the social goal 
can be pursued by the horizontal instrument provided to groups (collective capabili-
ties). In doing this, such horizontal instrument may strengthen the principle of subsidi-
arity by a bottom-up pursuing of the social goal. 
As a result, a minimally just State must work to demand that threshold level of capa-
bility be ensured for all groups living under the threshold, to be able to convert their 
collective capabilities into collective combined capabilities (adapted by Fennell, 
2013:168).  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
This paper has analysed the need to include a collective dimension of capabilities 
within the CA to empower democracy. The CA has been indeed criticized for being too 
individualistic as it is overly focused on ‘individual’ capabilities. The article has then 
adopted the Nussbaum's version of the CA as a conceptual framework for adding a list 
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of collective combined capabilities, due to its focus on capabilities categorization and 
its list of combined capabilities.  
Given the limited capacity of governments to ensure the threshold level of basic 
rights for all citizens, the paper has provided an expanded reading of the CA by provid-
ing a categorization of the collective capabilities based on the ontological distinction 
between individual and collective capabilities. The notion of collective subject has been 
therefore developed to support this argumentation, so as to introduce ‘the first person 
plural’ in addition to and to complement ‘the first person singular’. 
The idea of collectivity, as it emerges from this extension, is indeed the expression of 
a sort of transition from ‘the philosophy of the self’ to ‘the philosophy of the us’, where 
‘us’ is limited in the scope by both the notion of collective subject and the end. As for 
the scope, it has been clarified that any group subjected to capability deprivation con-
stitute a collective subject entitled to exercise the collective capabilities. As for the end, 
what is required to constitute a collective subject is the social goal of getting affected 
groups above the capability threshold. In doing this, the relationship between individu-
als and collectivity may be well conceived in terms of addition, rather than subtraction. 
In fact, individuals do not join the collectivity by ceding even partly their rights to a 
sovereign authority, but they expand their capabilities by achieving together what 
none can achieve alone. 
The paper has also demonstrated the coherence of such extension with the CA’s in-
dividual framework on the ground that the collective capabilities ultimately depend 
upon the individual capacity of affiliation. Accordingly, the individual remains the main 
reference point.  
Finally, the paper has shown how the collective capabilities represent a valuable hor-
izontal instrument for removing forms of un-freedoms and expanding citizens’ capabili-
ties. The principle of subsidiarity might be well strengthened by such bottom-up pursu-
ing of the social goal: getting groups subjected to capability deprivation above the ca-
pability threshold. A purposely outstanding issue in the paper is that of the collective 
responsibility.  
Providing such horizontal instrument, such as the collective capabilities, in order to 
compensate governments’ incapacities to achieve the social goal may well imply to 
acknowledge collective responsibilities: collective obligations are to be met in order to 
secure those new (expanded) substantial freedoms. The issue seems then worth ex-
ploring, and indeed one purpose of my contribution is to encourage future research on 
this topic. 
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